Saint Louis University Law Journal
Volume 46
Number 4 (Fall 2002)

Article 9

9-24-2002

Taking One for the Team: Principle of Treaty Adherence as a
Social Imperative for Preserving Globalization and International
Legal Legitimacy as Upheld in In re World War II Era Japanese
Forced Labor Litigation
Nicholas P. Van Deven

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj

Recommended Citation
Nicholas P. Van Deven, Taking One for the Team: Principle of Treaty Adherence as a Social Imperative for
Preserving Globalization and International Legal Legitimacy as Upheld in In re World War II Era Japanese
Forced Labor Litigation, 46 St. Louis U. L.J. (2002).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj/vol46/iss4/9

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Saint Louis University Law Journal by an authorized editor of Scholarship Commons. For more information,
please contact Susie Lee.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

TAKING ONE FOR THE TEAM: PRINCIPLE OF TREATY
ADHERENCE AS A SOCIAL IMPERATIVE FOR PRESERVING
GLOBALIZATION AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL LEGITIMACY
AS UPHELD IN IN RE WORLD WAR II ERA JAPANESE FORCED
LABOR LITIGATION1

But among those in the political establishment who have followed the sparse
Japanese media coverage of the suits, there is growing anxiety and barely
concealed resentment. Some see greedy U.S. lawyers plotting to mug “deeppocket” Japanese companies, which are vulnerable because they do business in
the United States, over a reparations issue that Japan believed was settled by
the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty . . . . “This is really a form of extortion,”
said a source close to the Japanese government . . . . Managers and employees
of the blue-chip corporations being sued who were born in the postwar
period . . . may well view the lawsuits as a business opportunity for U.S.
litigators and defense attorneys.2

I. INTRODUCTION
During times of global upheaval, the preservation of the international legal
schematic proves essential. Indeed, the events surrounding the September 11th
tragedy demand such preservation. As affiliates of the United Nations scamper
to adopt and alter applicable resolutions on terrorism, nationals of individual
states ponder their own internal strategies in an effort to cope with sadness,
rage and a peculiar sense of helplessness. Once the emotional cloud dissipates,
however, families of victims and domestic organizations will no doubt begin to
inquire about their rights to recovery and degrees of compensation for their
respective losses.3 A right to private redress in American tribunals as a
1. In re World War II Era Japanese Forced Labor Litigation, 114 F. Supp. 2d 939 (N.D.
Cal. 2000) [hereinafter World War II Case].
2. Sonni Efron, Pursuit of WWII Redress Hits Japanese Boardrooms; Courts: As Lawsuits
Begin to Mount, Anxiety and Resentment Grow in Tokyo Over Alleged Victims’ “Extortion”, L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 10, 2000, at A1.
3. On November 5, 2001, the Justice Department disclosed its efforts to create a fund for
victims of the September 11th tragedy. Soon after the disaster, Congress passed legislation in an
effort to pool funds to cover the lost earnings of victims and to compensate both them and their
families for subsequent pain and suffering. For purposes of creating a rational system for
distribution of the funds, the Justice Department has suggested that all prospective beneficiaries
who apply to the fund receive compensation within 120 days of application. By seeking aid from
the survivor’s fund, “applicants [would] forfeit the right to sue the airlines, insurance companies,
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response to international atrocities has long been a question for the United
States legal system. While victim’s of international aggression at times receive
justice, others are asked to “take one for the team” and turn the other cheek in
favor of international harmony. With its resurgence in 1999,4 this topic has
been rigorously debated in both federal and state venues.
Decided on September 21, 2000, the World War II Case represented the
efforts of a class of aggrieved veterans who sought redress in a California state
court for the inhumane acts imposed upon them subsequent to their capture by
Japanese forces in 1941.5 The original representative in the class action suit,
James King, set forth a detailed account of his capture and injuries while
working in a Japanese steel mill.6 Despite their efforts, King and his associates
were denied access to compensation in a federal tribunal because of the
binding terms of the 1951 Treaty of Peace, established between President
Truman and the remains of the Japanese Empire.7 As a matter of basic treaty
law, where the terms of a treaty are unambiguous, the court must rule in
accordance with the plain language of the treaty.8 Conversely, in ambiguous
treaty scenarios, courts possess the option to consult the history and purpose of
negotiation to supplement its plain meaning analysis.9 Rooted in a laundry list
of similar holdings handed down from U.S. domestic tribunals, this theory of
judicial deference afforded in treaty scenarios is, indeed, nothing new.10

the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, and others for potentially greater damages.”
See Carrie Johnson, Justice Dept. to Open Victim’s Fund Debate, WASH. POST, Nov. 5, 2001, at
A10, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A39471-2001Nov4.html (last
visited Mar. 18, 2002). Such a showing of Congressional intent for an individual to trade his or
her right to sue for nominal damages is significant. This strategy of claim preclusion has become
quite popular with both the Legislative and Executive Branches when met with litigation
scenarios that could damage national progression and morale. Id.
4. In 1999, numerous claimants from the World War II era began seeking redress in
domestic tribunals for alleged human rights atrocities committed by Germany and her allies. See
Burger-Fischer v. Degussa AG, 65 F. Supp. 2d 248, 250 (D.N.J. 1999); Iwanowa v. Ford Motor
Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 431-32 (D.N.J. 1999).
5. World War II Case, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 942.
6. Id. (“When captured, King was 20 years old, 5 feet 11 inches tall and weighed 167
pounds. At the conclusion of the war, he weighed 98 pounds.”).
7. Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International
Law State Responsibility for Injury to Aliens: Diplomatic Protections and International Claims,
95 AM. J. INT’L L. 139, 140 (2001).
8. Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 194-95 (1961) (citing Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290
U.S. 276, 294-95 (1933)) (noting that the principles of international law recognize no right to
extradition apart from a treaty).
9. See World War II Case, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 945-46 (stating that “[t]o the extent that
[treaty language] raises any uncertainty, however, the court ‘may look beyond the written words
to the history of the treaty’”); see also Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122, 134 (1989).
10. Sullivan v. Kidd, 254 U.S. 433, 442 (1921), and Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447, 468
(1913), represent judicial landmarks in the area of treaty deference.
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Because numerous legal scholars have addressed the relationship between
foreign relations and domestic law in great detail,11 this Note will expose
nothing new with reference to that topic. The novelty of this Note lies rather in
the policy argument presented.
This Note mainly will examine the international policy stemming from
judicial decisions that consider treaties as paramount to domestic law. Often,
citizens of sovereign nations view international legal scenarios through
domestic lenses only. In short, international citizens frequently desire a
resolution to international disputes in a fashion that will reap a sizable benefit
to them, despite its possible adverse effects on the global system. Decisions
such as the World War II Case properly aim to think “outside the domestic
box” and lend support to the intentions of a few insightful politicians who wish
to view the United States as a member of a greater “international team.” As
skepticism mounts in response to the alleged ineffectiveness of international
law, the World War II Case offers a breath of fresh air. Simply, this case
proves that the international system actually works.
To that end, this Note is divided into five remaining parts. Part II explores
the subtle nuances of the World War II Case itself, while Part III assesses its
historical legal roots from both home and abroad.12 Excerpts from applicable
foreign rulings reside in this portion of the Note to illustrate similarities in
judicial rationale used by courts when resolving wartime claims, regardless of
their geographic placement.
Part IV offers a legal analysis of treaties, such as the 1951 Treaty of Peace,
their relationship to conflicting domestic and international laws, and a legal
exercise that outlines possible arguments of plaintiffs under customary
international human rights law. Initially, Part IV focuses on the World War II
Case court’s basic analysis of the 1951 Treaty of Peace through accepted
notions of treaty interpretation. In addition to explicitly barring a remedy to
plaintiffs, the treaty takes precedence over the conflicting California state law
as a matter of domestic constitutional law.13 Following an analysis of the
World War II Case court’s basic legal rationale, this Note will explore other
11. See K. Lee Boyd, Are Human Rights Political Questions?, 53 RUTGERS L. REV. 277,
328 (2001); Developments in the Law—Corporate Liability for Violations of International
Human Rights Law, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2025, 2030-31 (2001).
12. While not concerned with treaties per se, the rationale behind both the South African and
Chilean decisions, discussed in Part III.B, share stark similarities to those made within the
confines of the American judiciary. Significant monetary compensation for human rights
offenses was seen as secondary to the desire to live in financial and social international harmony.
See Azanian Peoples Org. v. The President of the Rep. of South Africa, 1996 (4) SALR 637 (CC),
available at http://www.legalinfo.co.za/data/CL/1796.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2002); Chanfeau
Orayce v. Chile, Cases 11.505 et al., Inter-Am. C.H.R. 512, OEA/ser.L/V/II.98, doc. 7 rev.
(1997), available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/cases/1997/chile25-98html (last visited Mar.
18, 2002).
13. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) ON FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 111(1) (1987).
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possible arguments that could have been more fruitful for plaintiffs in the
disputed matter.14 Specifically, plaintiffs could have argued that the treaty
itself was invalid because it conflicted with a norm of customary international
law.15 While such an argument is sound in theory, both international and
domestic weaknesses persist.
In Part V of the Note, a strict policy analysis provides support to the
position that, if private claims are allowed in spite of treaty provisions which
forbid even their existence, the effect on the international legal schematic will
prove crippling. As a policy issue, treaties may not be ignored for reasons of
convenience or national interest. When prominent nation states, such as the
United States, unilaterally revoke the effectiveness of certain treaties, a
harmful message of “non-compliance upon convenience” is conveyed to the
international legal community. Considering the less than stellar reputation of
the United States in its treatment of and adherence to international agreements,
the time has come for the United States to make a statement in support of
honoring its duty to comply with agreements that seek to solidify its bond with
the global community.
II. BEGINNING AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR IN RE WORLD WAR II ERA
JAPANESE FORCED LABOR LITIGATION
The claim involved in the World War II Case was originally brought by
James King, a veteran of the Second World War, on behalf of a host of other
veterans,16 before a California state court under the California Code of Civil
Procedure § 354.6.17 The California code provision was relatively untested
until the present action was brought. Specifically, it permitted an action by a
prisoner of war of the Nazi regime, its allies or sympathizers, “to recover
compensation for labor performed as a Second World War slave labor
victim, . . . from any entity or successor in interest thereof, for whom that labor
was performed.”18 The named defendants quickly motioned for and succeeded
in removal to a federal tribunal.19 Such a move was proper because the

14. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
15. JORDAN J. PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 198 (1996).
16. In addition to Count I, which was brought specifically under the California Code of Civil
Procedure, Count II sought to recover on an unjust enrichment claim in which the plaintiff sought
disgorgement and restitution of economic benefits derived from his labor. In Count III, the
plaintiff sought damages for the torts of battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and
unlawful imprisonment. Finally, Count IV sought damages from defendant’s failure to reveal its
prior exploitation of prisoner labor to present day customers in California and elsewhere under a
theory of unfair business practices. See World War II Case, 114 F. Supp. 2d 939, 944 (N.D. Cal.
2000).
17. Id.
18. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 354.6(b) (West 1999).
19. World War II Case, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 942.
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plaintiffs’ claims necessarily required determinations that directly and
significantly affected United States foreign relations, making this issue a
federal question.20 Upon removal, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California was left to resolve: (1) whether the suit should
be remanded to state court; and (2) whether the defendant’s motion to dismiss
was properly based on the principle of treaty preclusion.21 Because the court
disposed of the venue controversy with relative ease under 28 U.S.C. §
1441(a), it serves no purpose to elaborate on that topic. The focus of this
Note’s analysis will instead concentrate on both the treaty-based preclusion
argument and the ensuing policy created from the aftermath of the decision.
A.

The Court Honors the Agreement

To provide an initial frame of reference, the exact language of Article 14
of the 1951 Treaty of Peace is provided to illustrate the unambiguous nature of
its terminology. The Treaty of Peace provided in part:
(1) a grant of authority of Allied Powers to seize Japanese property within their
jurisdiction at the time of the treaty’s effective date; (2) an obligation of Japan
to assist in the rebuilding of territory occupied by Japanese forces during the
war and (3) waiver of all “other claims of the Allied Powers and their
nationals arising out of any actions taken by Japan and its nationals in the
course of the prosecution of the war.”22

Echoing the principles of its judicial predecessors in Sullivan and Kolovrat,23
the World War II Case court upheld the principle that where the verbiage of a
treaty is quite unambiguous, the court’s analysis will end there and the plain
meaning of the instrument will prevail.24 In the World War II Case, the court
insisted that the waiver language present in the above treaty provision was
20. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1994) (providing that “any civil action brought in a State court
of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the
defendant”); see also Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 163 (1997) (asserting the
“proprietary of removal thus depends on whether the case originally could have been filed in
federal court”); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964) (explaining that
the Court was “constrained to make it clear that an issue concerned with a basic choice regarding
the competence and function of the Judiciary and the National Executive in ordering our
relationships with other members of the international community must be treated exclusively as
an aspect of federal law”). Compare CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 354.6(b) (West 1999), with Treaty
of Peace with Japan, Sept. 8, 1951, U.S.-Japan, art. 14(a), 3 U.S.T. 1935, available at
http://www.vcn.bc.ca/alpha/sfpt/SanFranciscoPeaceTreaty1951.htm (last visited June 16, 2002)
(providing for the waiver of all “other claims of the Allied Powers and their nationals arising out
of any actions taken by Japan and its nationals in the course of the prosecution of the war”).
21. World War II Case, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 942.
22. Id. at 945 (quoting Treaty of Peace with Japan, Sept. 8, 1951, U.S.-Japan, art. 14(a)(b), 3
U.S.T. 1935) (emphasis added).
23. See infra text accompanying notes 44-50.
24. World War II Case, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 945.
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quite unambiguous.25 Thus, their analysis of the agreement, as a matter of
domestic treaty interpretation, ended there. To avoid the preclusive effect of
the treaty, the plaintiffs sought to distinguish their claim from those falling
under the agreement. If successful, the plaintiffs could have asserted that their
claims under state law did not conflict with the provisions of the treaty and,
thus, escaped preemption under the Supremacy Clause.26 They suggested that
the authors of the treaty had no intention of waiving the claims of prisoners of
war because the treaty failed to expressly include such claims in the waiver
itself.27 The court was quick to strike such a narrow assertion however,
because it felt, in accordance with the strict language of Article 19(b), the
Treaty of Peace envisaged the waiver of “all claims” regarding Japanese
wartime atrocities.28 The court held that the waiver was broad enough to
encompass the present litigation; there was no need to insert an amendment for
clarification.29
B.

An Eye on Policy

Bearing a stark resemblance to the rationale set forth in a matter
concerning South Africa,30 the World War II Case court stressed policy as an
over-riding reason for keeping the terms and enforcement provisions of the
treaty in tact. Beyond the actual text of the document, the court, citing
numerous politicians, indicated that the underlying purpose of the waiver was
to achieve a sense of finality.31 As stated by the chief negotiator of the 1951
Treaty of Peace, John Foster Dulles, “leaving open the possibility of future
claims would be an unacceptable impediment to a lasting peace.”32 Further
rationale behind the comments of Dulles can best be demonstrated by his role
in other post-war negotiations.

25. Id. at 946 (adding that “[n]evertheless, the court has conducted its own review of the
historical materials, and concludes that they reinforce the conclusion”).
26. U.S. CONST. art. VI (stating that “[t]his Constitution and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in [p]ursuance thereof, and all [t]reaties made, or which shall be made, under
the [a]uthority of the United States, shall be the supreme [l]aw of the land, and the [j]udges in
every [s]tate shall be bound thereby”).
27. World War II Case, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 945.
28. Id. (articulating that “Article 19(b) states that the Japanese waiver included ‘any claims
and debts arising in respect to Japanese prisoners of war and civilian internees in the hands of the
Allied Powers’”).
29. Id.
30. See discussion infra Part III.B.1.
31. World War II Case, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 946.
32. Id. Dulles went on to say that demanding reparations of Japan directly following the war
would have hindered their economy to the point of financial impracticability. Since that time,
however, Japan has emerged as one of the world’s most efficient and prominent economic
powerhouses. The plaintiffs in the present action cited this change as reason for payment. Id. at
947.
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As the World War II Case court hinted in its decision, the negotiating
parties of the 1951 Treaty of Peace, specifically Dulles, had the future upswing
of Communism in mind when agreeing to the treaty’s provisions.33 Recalling
his involvement in the Paris Peace Conference at the close of World War I in
1919, Dulles remembered his unsuccessful efforts in convincing his fellow
countrymen that burdening the Germans with hefty reparations would send
their economy into a downward spiral.34 Arguably, such an economic
depression gave rise to Nazi sentiments, seeking to revive the German State
under a common socialist philosophy. In turn, Dulles vowed not to let history
repeat itself upon the close of World War II.35 Imposing heavy reparations
upon Japan, in his opinion, would make them susceptible to the emerging
Communist movement in Asia. A waiver of future private claims against both
Japan and its corporations would provide it with the economic stability to
combat a Communist ideology brewing in neighboring China. The court in the
dispute at issue agreed with the sentiments of Dulles and sought to uphold the
treaty provisions based upon the preservation of established foreign policy.
Judge Vaughn Walker suggested, as follows:
[B]ecause of the success of the [1951 Treaty of Peace] and of Japan in
becoming a strong ally and partner of the United States, the waiver of
individual rights to pursue private parties in Japan was justified. This has been
the argument in the dozens of suits brought in Japan and a smaller number of
cases in American courts. And the argument has so far prevailed. . . . Japan’s
reparation deals with some countries might present the opportunity for the
signatory nations of 1951 to bring their own claims, as provided for in Article
26 of the treaty. However, “the question of enforcing Article 26” . . . is “for
the United States, not the plaintiffs, to decide.”36

Similar sentiments were conveyed by the U.S. Department of State Legal
Advisor, Ronald J. Bettauer, when the World War II Case was pending in
California. In his expert opinion, Bettauer stated that “[t]he overarching intent
of those who negotiated, signed, and ultimately ratified this [t]reaty was to
bring about a complete, global settlement of all war-related claims, in order to
provide both compensation to the victims of the war and to rebuild Japan’s

33. Id. at 946.
34. Steven C. Clemons, Recovering Japan’s Wartime Past—and Ours, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4,
2001, at A23.
35. See id.
36. Id. Judge Walker suggested that Japan entered into specific agreements with other
signatories of the 1951 Treaty, namely the Netherlands, in an effort to overcome the waiver to
private reparations. Walker suggested further that such an agreement, which permits certain
nations to sue privately despite the waiver provision, lies within the discretion of the federal
government of the nation in question. He further commented that citizens of the United States
should honor the informed decision of their elected politicians in an effort to preserve
international business relations. Id.
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economy and convert Japan into a strong U.S. ally.”37 Furthermore, he noted
that the United States government instituted additional compensatory schemes,
assuring that the victims of the war atrocities were made whole.38 In short, the
court shared the view of its counterparts in the State Department that “the
immeasurable bounty of life for [the victims] and their posterity in a free
society and in a more peaceful world service[d] the debt” owed to them.39
Unbeknownst to the court at the time of the World War II Case, such a policy
of “progress over vengeance” would be re-affirmed a year later by a federal
court in New Jersey.40
III. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF TREATY DEFERENCE
When dissecting a court decision that has a similar rationale to prior cases,
it is essential to expose particular principles echoed by each court. Such
continued rationale is found in the line of cases prior to the World War II Case.
The first principle involved is the premise that when nations establish a treaty,
or a treaty-like mechanism, both the purpose and policy assigned to it by the
negotiating parties, namely the executive branches of each nation state, will be
controlling.41 In the context of individual war reparations, “[t]he war-related
claims of individual citizens can be asserted only by their government,”42
promoting a unified national voice. The second common principle expands
upon the first. When nations agree to alternative venues and methods for
monetary redress, they do so under the assumption that availing oneself of the
traditional legal process will pose recovery obstacles for victims.43

37. Murphy, supra note 7, at 140 (citing Former U.S. World War II POW’s: A Struggle For
Justice: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 14, 14-15 (2000)).
38. Id. (“The scheme of the [t]reaty was that each state party would compensate its own
nationals for their injuries, either out of confiscated Japanese public and private assets, or
otherwise . . . . The U.S. Congress amended the War Claims Act of 1948 to create new war
claims programs that would award American war victims. . . .”).
39. World War II Case, 114 F. Supp. 2d 939, 949 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
40. In re Nazi Era Cases Against German Defs. Litigation, 129 F. Supp. 2d 370, 372 (D.N.J.
2001) [hereinafter Nazi Era Cases].
41. Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 194 (1961).
42. Burger-Fischer v. Degussa AG, 65 F. Supp. 2d 248, 274 (D.N.J. 1999) (suggesting that
such “war related claims, [even] those not explicitly addressed [in the treaty itself], are
extinguished by [any resulting] peace settlement”).
43. Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 489 (D.N.J. 1999) (“[T]he span
between the doing of the damage and the application of the claimed assuagement is too vague.
The time is too long. The identity of the alleged tortfeasors is too indefinite. The procedure
sought . . . is too complicated, too costly. . . .”).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2002]

A.

TAKING ONE FOR THE TEAM

1099

Decisions From Home—The United States’ Approach
1.

Yielding to Plain Treaty Language and Interpretation of the Executive

Evinced by its legal tradition, the United States courts adhere to a plain
meaning rule. Cases in the past have illustrated the foundations of treaty
interpretation. As stated by Justice Day in Sullivan v. Kidd, a case which
involved property rights of foreign nationals, “treaties are to be interpreted
upon the principles which govern the interpretation of contracts in writing
between individuals, and are to be executed in the utmost good faith, with a
view to making effective the purposes of the high contracting parties.”44 The
actual wording of the treaty in question is essential because it is assumed that
the drafters of the agreement desired to leave each participating nation on
equal footing.45 As in Sullivan, the Supreme Court was asked in Kolovrat v.
Oregon to resolve another internationally tempered property dispute.46
However, Kolovrat was distinguishable from Sullivan because it sought to go
beyond the plain meaning of the instrument. Enforcing a 1948 Treaty,
Kolovrat deferred authority to interpretations of the Executive Branch, desiring
to “bring about . . . stability and uniformity in the difficult field of world
Justice Black’s majority opinion
monetary controls and exchange.”47
expressed his skepticism regarding whether such interpretations could ever be
effectively realized considering the limited language of the agreement.
However, despite his argument that the agreement may fall short of its goal,
Justice Black recognized that the Executive Branch of the United States had
spoken, and that the “power to make policy with regard to such matters is a
national one from the compulsion of both necessity and our Constitution.”48

44. Sullivan v. Kidd, 254 U.S. 433, 439 (1921) (emphasis added). Here, Sullivan was met
with a property rights issue and interpreted the effect of a beneficiary’s foreign nationality on his
rights to inherit land in the United States. The court held that notice of such transfer of
possession was required of both foreign and U.S nationals, preserving reciprocity and equality.
Id. at 442-43.
45. Id. at 439. “[T]he general purpose and object of such conventions [are] to secure
equality in exchange of privileges and reciprocity in rights granted and secured.” Id. at 440.
46. See Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187 (1961). Compare OR. REV. STAT. § 111.070
(1961), with Treaty of Commerce Between the United States of America and Serbia, 1881, U.S.Serb., arts. 1-3, 22 Stat. 963, 964 (illustrating that while the Oregon Statute sought to limit the
property rights of foreign nationals with respect to domestic U.S. plots, the treaty afforded
Yugoslavians and Serbian nationals “the liberty to acquire and dispose of such property”).
47. Kolovrat, 366 U.S. at 198. The Court reiterated that “if these rights of acquiring,
possessing or disposing . . . were not afforded . . . the Treaty’s effectiveness in achieving its
express purpose of ‘facilitating . . . commercial relations’ would obviously be severely limited.”
Id. at 194. As taken from Supreme Court case law, domestic principles of treaty interpretation
insist that the judiciary adhere to particular interpretations of the Executive. Such a notion creates
a separation of powers issue. Id.
48. Id. at 198.
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Thus, the courts in both Sullivan and Kolovrat displayed their lack of
competence to enact policy contrary to clearly articulated treaty provisions or
varying Executive interpretations. Such recognition is rooted in the principles
of exclusive commitment as defined in Article II of the United States
Constitution.49 Hence, the interpretation of the Executive Branch should
prevail.50
2.

Alternative Venues and Methods of Monetary Redress

Because the World War II Case began in protest to a grant of reparations to
Japanese prison camp survivors, a discussion of such reparations as alternative
forms of compensation is important. In recent years, domestic courts have
been urged to treat an individual and his claim against a foreign nation as the
same entity. Simply, one’s claim “is only a right of his government against
that of the [alleged defendant].”51 This principle was applied in Dames &
Moore v. Regan,52 where, as a result of its withholding hostages in 1979, Iran
lost its access to certain national assets. Subsequently, the United States
Government traded away American citizens’ ability to collect debts against
Iranian corporations in American courts.53 In spite of such a limitation on the
venue in which redress could be obtained, aggrieved parties sought
enforcement of liens and attachments against Iran within a designated IranUnited States Claims Tribunal.54 Apart from the fact that the Claims Tribunal
removed a number of jurisdictional and procedural obstacles to recovery,
providing such a forum meant “that the claimants [would receive] something in
return for the suspension of their claims, namely, access to an international
tribunal.”55 Arguably, recovery rates were not affected by such a designation.

49. U.S. CONST. art. II, §2 (stating that “[the President] shall have power, by and with the
[a]dvice and [c]onsent of the Senate, to make [t]reaties”); see discussion infra Part III (providing
a more in-depth discussion of how the separation of powers allows for the President to make
treaties in a rather unchecked manner).
50. It should be noted here that while an Executive interpretation was not needed in the
World War II Case because of the clear language of the applicable treaty provisions, the court did
go a step beyond the minimum protocol and did include a reference to the interpretation of the
Executive. World War II Case, 114 F. Supp. 2d 939, 948 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
51. Burger-Fischer v. Degussa AG, 65 F. Supp. 2d 248, 274 (D.N.J. 1999) (citing
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 902 (1987)).
52. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
53. Id. at 656 (permitting “the President to maintain foreign assets at his disposal for use in
negotiating the resolution of a declared national emergency [with] the frozen assets serv[ing] as
‘bargaining chips’ to be used . . . when dealing with a hostile country”).
54. Id. at 687. Congress implicitly approved the practice of claims settlement by executive
agreement through their enactment of The International Claims Settlement Act of 1949. The Act
itself gave rise to the International Claims Commission, giving it “jurisdiction to make final and
binding decisions with respect to claims by United States nationals.” Id. at 657.
55. Id. at 687.
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Almost a decade after Dames & Moore, the U. S. District Court for New
Jersey was faced with similar problems in a case seeking compensation for
forced labor in German factories during World War II.56 Because over thirty
years passed between the alleged malfeasance and the legal proceeding, it was
extremely difficult for a plaintiff to call witnesses to testify based upon their
flawed memory of the alleged events.57 Any recovery was contingent upon the
establishment of an alternative tribunal where such victims of slave labor could
seek monetary redress.58 This forum was not available until the creation of
The Foundation “Remembrance, Responsibility and the Future” (the
“Foundation”) in July of 2000.59
The Foundation was formed by agreement between President Bill Clinton
and German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder in December of 1999.60 Subject to
the provisions of the agreement, each aggrieved party was to seek redress from
the Foundation exclusively in exchange for their verbal assurance that no
private cause of action would surface in a United States court.61 President
Clinton agreed to this alternative method of recovery because of the relatively
“advanced age of victims” and his desire to show results as soon as possible
through a mechanism of expedited payment.62 To date, almost $100 billion
has been paid out as reparations to Nazi Era victims. Including moneys
contributed primarily by the German private sector, the Foundation expects to

56. Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 431 (D.N.J. 1999). Resembling the
factual basis for the plaintiffs’ claim in the World War II Case, Plaintiff Iwanowa claimed that
Ford Motor Company “coerced her, and thousands of other persons, to perform forced labor
under inhuman conditions.” Id. Specifically, she sought “compensation for the reasonable value
of her services.” Id. at 432.
57. Id. at 489.
58. See Nazi Era Cases, 129 F. Supp. 2d 370, 376 (D.N.J. 2001). Historically, the Paris,
Transition, and London Debt Agreements made between Germany and the Allied Powers
remained silent on issues of private reparation claims. On September 12, 1990, the 2+4 Treaty
reunited Germany and returned to it the ability to handle both foreign and domestic affairs. Id. at
377.
59. Id. at 379.
60. Id. The initiative to create such a quasi-claims settlement tribunal was fostered as early
as 1998 by both the German Chancellor and various German corporations. Such an initiative
culminated in the Chancellor’s meeting with President Clinton a year later. Id.
61. Id. at 379. Compare Foundation “Remembrance, Responsibility and the Future,” Dec.
1999, U.S.-F.R.G., with Treaty of Peace with Japan, Sept. 8, 1951, U.S.-Japan, art. 14(a), 3
U.S.T. 3169 (illustrating that both agreements provided for nominal monetary recovery to victims
in exchange for claim preclusion in United States courts).
62. Nazi Era Cases, 129 F. Supp. 2d at 380 (“The position of the United States government
recommending dismissal is motivated by the twin concerns of justice and urgency: matters of
Holocaust-Era restitution are best resolved through dialogue, negotiation, and cooperation as
opposed to prolonged and uncertain litigation . . . [providing] some measure of justice and
compensation to aged victims in their lifetimes.”).
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pay an additional $4.3 billion.63 In short, the Foundation, a treaty-like
mechanism, supported the overall premise that international agreements were
worthwhile and effective alternatives to private causes of action. The
“effectiveness” of the alternative can be gauged in terms of both economic
benefits and increased convenience.
As evinced in the Nazi Era Cases, often the plaintiffs who are part of
reparations claims are parties to a class action lawsuit. When parties avail
themselves of a class action lawsuit, they will most likely receive, if the suit is
successful, an amount comparable to an amount that the Foundation posits to
provide. Because damage awards in civil trials are distributed between
attorneys and fellow plaintiffs, one may be better off simply collecting from
the alternative tribunal or recovery instrument. Thus, in terms of economics,
the alternative tribunal may be a more attractive alternative.64
In terms of convenience, a possible litigant should view the alternative
tribunal as superior. When politicians form alternative recovery instruments,
such an instrument is the product of their work for the sole benefit of aggrieved
parties. In a sense, the aggrieved parties are spoon-fed an opportunity to
recover for the atrocities committed against them. Organizational efforts are
minimized so that aggrieved parties are required only to submit their names
into a pool of applicants to be considered for relief.
B.

Decisions From Abroad—Actions Taken by South Africa and Chile

While rights to private actions were bargained away by American
politicians throughout the twentieth century via treaty provisions, nations
located in distant hemispheres of the globe implemented similar non-suit
provisions against their own citizens. While not dealing with wars waged
against foreign nation states, both the South African and Chilean governments
established claim preclusion agreements regarding intrastate wars prompted by
rogue government organizations. When viewed in connection with the World
War II Case, the purpose and implementation of these foreign acts are similar
to the American decision. While the use of non-suit provisions cannot become
international customary law,65 it is worth noting the pattern of usage of this

63. Id. at 381.
64. Id.
65. Generally, treaties may be accepted as customary international law. As noted by the ICJ
in the North Sea Continental Cases, it is possible for the specific terms of treaties to generate
customary international law subsequent to their adoption.
LOUIS HENKIN ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES & MATERIALS 101 (3d ed. 2000). However, creation of
international law does not come easy. Specifically, to invoke a treaty as custom, one must show
the following: (1) constant and uniform application of the principle, (2) the practice of states must
evidence the presence of such a custom as if they were adhering to a legal obligation, not merely
following habit, and (3) the states who sign the treaty must have an interest in its content. North
Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 38-41 (Feb. 20).
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technique in national governments throughout the world. Simply, if various
governments spanning across the globe believe that such provisions have
merit, perhaps they really are viable options to private redress.
1.

South Africa Seeks Forgiveness Over Vengeance

While the World War II veterans contested established reparation systems
during the 1990’s in American courtrooms, the Constitutional Court of South
Africa engaged in a similar issue with its citizens to resolve Apartheid
grievances.66 The leading decision, Azanian Peoples Organization v. The
President of the Republic of South Africa, responded to the formation of and
remedies prescribed by the Commission on Truth and Reconciliation (the
“TRC”).67 As expected, citizens exposed to the aftermath of South African
oppression were dissatisfied with Nelson Mandela’s proposed truth-finding
tribunal.68
a.

The Commission

Once the remains of Apartheid dissolved in 1994, Nelson Mandela
assumed the position of President of South Africa and played an integral part
in the formation of its Parliament.69 In 1995, the South African Parliament
enacted the Truth and Reconciliation Act, which gave rise to the TRC.70 The
TRC had two primary roles, which included both “a truth finding function with
the power to confer amnesty on an individual basis” and a general objective to
“promote national unity and reconciliation in a spirit of understanding.”71 The
nature of the TRC was very similar to that of other truth commissions
established previously in Uganda, Bolivia, Argentina, Zimbabwe and Chile to
resolve their own histories of political and social unrest.72 However, the TRC
differed in one fundamental way. While its reformatory predecessors
established confidential commissions of truth, South African leaders were
quite insistent in their demand that all oppressors from the Apartheid-era come
personally before the tribunal to confess their sins to the public.73 The purpose
66. See Azanian Peoples Org. v. President of the Rep. of S. Afr., 1996 (4) SALR 637, 638
(CC), available at http://www.legalinfo.co.za/data/CL/1796.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2002).
67. LOUIS HENKIN ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS 633 (1999).
68. Azanian Peoples Org., 1996 (4) SALR at 637.
69. Robert I. Rotberg, Truth Commissions and the Provisions of Truth, Justice, and
Reconciliation, in TRUTH V. JUSTICE: THE MORALITY OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS 5 (Robert I.
Rotberg & Dennis Thompson eds., 2000).
70. Id.
71. Azanian Peoples Org., 1996 (4) SALR at 641.
72. See Rotberg, supra note 69, at 5.
73. Id. (explaining that while other nations “dared not hear testimony in public for fear that it
might be too inflammatory or arouse retaliation from the ousted military officers . . . the South
African commission not only insisted on public as well as private testimony . . . but it also went a
step further and permitted press and television reports”).
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behind such a practice was clear to both the international community and
citizens of the modified South African state. By providing citizens with an
intimate view of their oppressors on trial, the TRC provided each victim with a
sense of closure and inner redress.74 Arguably, such a feeling would be worth
more than the receipt of monetary recovery. Thus, it could be said that “[t]he
South African version of a commission empowered a popular understanding
incrementally, rather than comprehensively by polished summary.”75
Despite being embraced by numerous South African nationals, many
citizens were not supportive of the TRC purpose. Specifically, the applicants
in Azanian Peoples Organization contested the amnesty provision found in the
newly ratified South African Constitution, and sought prosecution of
Apartheid-era criminals.76
b.

Preserving the TRC Purpose

Proponents of the TRC challenged the amnesty provision by asserting a
constitutional argument, claiming that the newly formed South African
government lacked authority to deprive victims of their day in court.77
Furthermore, proponents asserted that the TRC was not, by definition, a court
of law and thus lacked the authority to settle such “justiciable disputes.”78 In
response, “[t]he Court found that the epilogue of the Constitution not only
authorize[d] Parliament to enact a law providing for amnesty in certain
circumstances, but oblige[d] it to do so.”79 In addition to such a retort, the
court based much of its decision on public policy.80
The South African Constitutional Court considered the grave difficulty that
would plague the success of victims’ private claims, including missing
relatives, the inability to link the perpetrators to certain offenses and the
lengthy time span between the offenses and court dates. It argued that a
greater injustice would ensue by allowing victims to pursue claims.81
74. Id. at 6 (proclaiming that not only is “[t]here is a strong sense that a society can move
forward only after it comes to terms with its collective angst, . . . [but t]here is an assumption that
a society emerging from an intrastate cataclysm of violence will remain stable, and prosper, only
if the facts of the past are made plain”).
75. Id.
76. Azanian Peoples Org., 1996 (4) SALR at 645.
77. Id. (arguing that the applicants have a “clear right to insist that such wrongdoers should
properly be prosecuted and punished . . . [and] should be ordered by the ordinary courts of the
land to pay adequate civil compensation”).
78. Id.
79. HENKIN ET AL., supra note 67, at 636; see also Promotion of National Unity and
Reconciliation Act, July 26, 1995, S. Afr., Act 95-34, § 20(7), available at http://www.fas.org/
irp/world/rsa/act95_034.htm (last visited Mar. 18, 2002).
80. Azanian Peoples Org., 1996 (4) SALR at 654-60.
81. Id. at 648 (“The alternative to the grant of immunity from criminal prosecution of
offenders is to keep intact the abstract right to such a prosecution for particular persons without
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Allowing claimants to proceed with a private cause of action under an
assumption that oppressors would be brought to justice purported to do more
harm than good.82 While the court did not validate a “blanket immunity” to
future oppressors, it did seek to legitimize the present amnesty provision due to
the social climate present in South Africa.83 Indeed, “[d]ecisions of states in
transition, taken with a view to assisting such transition, are quite different
from acts of a state covering up its own crimes by granting itself immunity.”84
2.

Chilean Efforts to Forget Past Thwarted By Inter-American
Commission

During the late twentieth century, Chilean nationals were also tormented
and tortured by their own government.85 Under the regime of General
Pinochet, many citizens lived in a state of terror, awaiting a day when they
would have an opportunity to bring their oppressors to justice. Pinochet
reigned for seventeen years. A democratic government was then instated and a
movement began toward a resolution for the atrocities committed.86
Specifically, as in South Africa, a truth commission was established to sort
through the turmoil imposed upon Chilean citizens.87 Again, an amnesty
decree was the subject of much debate.88
Upon being asked to forgive and forget, victims resorted to a tribunal
outside of their own judiciary. They sought adjudication from the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights in an effort to preserve their right to
prosecution.89 Although Azanian Peoples Organization furthered similar
arguments, the treatment of the Chilean matter yielded quite a different result.
While the Commission acknowledged the need for pertinent information
regarding the whereabouts and condition of missing family members, it made a

the evidence to sustain the prosecution successfully, . . . [which] perpetuate[s] their legitimate
sense of resentment and grief . . . .”).
82. See id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 649. The Court stated: “there is a need for understanding but not for vengeance, a
need for reparation but not for retaliation, a need for ubuntu but not for victimi[z]ation.” Id. at
639.
85. Chanfeau Orayce v. Chile, Cases 11.505 et al., Inter-Am. C.H.R. 512,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95, doc. 7 rev. (1997), available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/cases/1997/
chile25-28.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2002).
86. Id. at 1.
87. Id. at 13.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1. “Their claims concern the fact that there has been neither trial nor identification
of those responsible nor punishments meted out against the perpetrators of these acts. . . .” Id. at
15.
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further demand of the Chilean government.90 Unlike the South African
decision, the Commission declared that Chile should “investigate the violations
committed within its jurisdiction, identify those responsible, and impose the
pertinent sanctions upon them.”91 The Commission explained that since Chile
was a party of the American Convention on Human Rights, it possessed a “true
‘obligation to do something’ in order to effectively guarantee such rights.”92 A
call for affirmative action replaced the sentiment for silent forgiveness.
The Chilean decision did illustrate that barring one’s access to a remedy
was not always a valid state practice. It did, however, serve the purpose of
showing another emerging practice of states. States desired to limit remedies
to its citizens, as opposed to barring them altogether.93 As articulated below,
some states have successfully limited individual access to a remedy, skirting an
international customary right that arguably affords a remedy in all cases
involving an injury.94
IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS: RECTIFYING THE WORLD WAR II CASE DECISIONS IN
TERMS OF INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC LAW
The judge in the World War II Case was quick to dismiss the suit because,
as a matter of treaty interpretation, the treaty, via its plain language, barred any
claim by the plaintiffs.95 Per the analysis of Judge Walker, Article 14(a) of the
1951 Treaty of Peace plainly stated that the agreement allowed for a “waiver of
all ‘other claims of the Allied Powers and their nationals arising out of any
actions taken by Japan and its nationals in the course of the prosecution of the
war.’”96 The present claim of the plaintiffs fell squarely within the treaty
language, “all . . . other claims of the Allied Powers and their nationals.”97
Even though the plaintiffs attempted to rely on a novel California state law to
skirt the treaty waiver of private claims, their efforts were doomed from the

90. Chanfeau Orayce, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 512 at 23 (“[T]he State is obliged to use the means
at its disposal to inform the relatives of the fate of the victims and, if they have been killed, the
location of their remains.”).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See discussion infra Part IV.A.1.
94. See discussion infra Part IV.A. But see PAUST, supra note 15, at 184 (suggesting that a
right to sue for human rights violations may embody a natural right).
95. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 325(1)
(1987) (stating that “[a]n international agreement is to be interpreted in good faith in accordance
with the ordinary meaning to be given to its terms in their context and in the light of its object and
purpose”).
96. World War II Case, 114 F. Supp. 2d 939, 945 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (citation omitted).
97. Id.
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start because of a foundational constitutional principle.98 Namely, the treaty,
possessing the status of federal law and thus representing the “law of the land,”
took precedence over any state law.99 Therefore, the presence of the
conflicting California state law did not effect the meaning and force of the
treaty.100
Although the legal issues facing the World War II Case court were rather
elementary in nature, comparatively complex arguments were ignored, but
remained at the disposal of the plaintiffs. These arguments were inherently
rooted in theories of customary international law. Specifically, one could
argue that the treaty was invalid because it conflicted with a norm of
customary international law.
A.

Possible Argument—1951 Treaty Had No Effect Because it Conflicted
with International Customary Law

As a preliminary issue, international custom represents an established rule
of international law evinced through uniform and continuous state practice.101
Unlike a treaty, custom need not be expressly or formally agreed upon for it to
have force upon all states.102 Simply, these customs or “norms” are the ground
rules for international activity.103 Applicable to the World War II Case, the
plaintiffs may have argued that due to the harsh treatment and involuntary
servitude that resulted from their forced labor during World War II, a human
rights violation occurred.104 Pursuant to recognized norms of international
law, victims of human rights violations are entitled to a remedy.105 Thus,
plaintiffs could have asserted that because the treaty instructed domestic courts
to bar such victims from any remedy, the treaty was in conflict with customary
international law and was, thus, invalid.106 However, in saying that the 1951
Treaty of Peace conflicted with international customary law, one should first
illustrate that a right to a remedy is truly a customary norm.

98. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 111(1) (1987)
(stating that “[i]nternational law and international agreements of the United States are law of the
United States and [are] supreme over the law of the several States”).
99. See U.S. CONST. art. VI.
100. Id.
101. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 710-12 (1900).
102. Id.
103. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 4-5 (4th ed. 1990)
104. See American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, art. 7, available at
http://www.cidh.org/Basicos/basic3.htm (last visited July 16, 2002) (stating that “[e]very person
has the right to personal liberty and security” and that “[n]o one shall be deprived of his physical
liberty”); see also Velasquez Rodriguez Case, reprinted in Inter-Am. C.H.R., INTER-AM. Y.B. ON
HUMAN RIGHTS 1988, at 978 (1991) [hereinafter Velasquez Rodriguez Case].
105. PAUST, supra note 15, at 212.
106. Id. at 184.
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In Marbury v. Madison,107 the United States Supreme Court first assented
to the norm that all parties who suffer an injury are entitled to a remedy.108 In
that opinion, Chief Justice Marshall stated that “[t]he very essence of civil
liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection
of the laws, whenever he receives an injury . . . [and] where there is a legal
right, there is also a legal remedy by suit, or action at law, whenever that right
is invaded.”109 Noting the competence of courts to hear a specific class of
cases, Chief Justice Marshall recognized in Fletcher v. Peck110 that judicial
tribunals “[were] established . . . to decide on human rights.”111 Almost two
centuries later, this principle of a customary right to a remedy was reaffirmed
in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,112 which stated that “[t]he . . . international law of
human rights . . . endows individuals with the right to invoke international
[customary] law, in a competent forum and under appropriate
circumstances.”113 Furthermore, one could assert that such a norm was
codified in both The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and The
American Convention on Human Rights.114 Article 8 of the Declaration states
that “[e]veryone has the right to an effective remedy by a competent national
tribunal for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the
constitution or by law.”115 Noting both the Declaration and the Convention
proves important to illustrate how the right to a remedy has been widely
accepted by states and tribunals in the international community as a customary
norm.116

107. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
108. PAUST, supra note 15, at 198.
109. Id. (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. at 163).
110. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
111. PAUST, supra note 15, at 199 (quoting Fletcher, 10 U.S. at 133).
112. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
113. See PAUST, supra note 15, at 200 (quoting the brief of the United States Executive
Branch in Filartiga, 630 F.2d 876). Professor Paust opined: “Although international law rarely
prescribes appropriate penalties or civil remedies, successful claimants should be able to obtain
actual or compensatory damages, court costs, and possibly attorney fees and travel expenses.” Id.
at 212.
114. Id. at 198; see also Velasquez Rodriguez Case, supra note 104, at 994.
115. PAUST, supra note 15, at 198.
116. In July of 1988, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights specifically applied the
principles of the American Convention on Human Rights in the Velasquez Rodriguez Case.
Velasquez Rodriguez Case, supra note 104, at 994. In the Velasquez Rodriguez Case, during the
period from 1981 to 1984, 100 to 150 persons disappeared in the Republic of Honduras. Often
the victims were kidnapped by force during daylight hours while meandering in public places. It
was public knowledge in Honduras that the kidnappings were carried out by military personnel,
the police or others acting under military order. Id. at 924-30. Relying on numerous provisions
of the American Convention on Human Rights, the Inter-American Court declared that Honduras
should take its own initiative to hunt down and punish those responsible for the kidnappings. Id.
at 1010.
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Applying the aforementioned analysis to the World War II Case, the
plaintiffs could have argued with impunity that the 1951 Treaty of Peace
conflicted directly with principles of customary international law. Recalling
the words of the treaty itself, Article 14(a) specifically and plainly waived any
claim that an aggrieved veteran may have had as a result of injuries suffered
during World War II. Practically, this waiver barred plaintiffs’ remedy in this
context. The treaty conflicted with an established norm of customary
international law, namely a right to a remedy for human rights offenses, and
should have been argued to be invalid. However, such a hypothetical
argument of treaty invalidation is not without its weaknesses.
1.

Critique of Plaintiffs’ Possible Argument: The International Legal
Component

As outlined above, there exists a possibility that the plaintiffs could have
argued the 1951 Treaty of Peace to be invalid because it conflicted with
international customary law.117 In theory, the conflict could arise because the
treaty barred aggrieved parties from any remedy for a human rights violation, a
right debatably rooted in customary international law.118 However, upon
closer analysis, one could assert that a true conflict does not exist between the
treaty and customary international law. Even assuming a conflict exists
between the treaty and the customary norm, it is not entirely clear that the
customary norm would trump the treaty as a matter of international law.119
Such arguments take shape when viewing the treaty in question as limiting a
remedy as opposed to being a complete bar to justice.
Contained in their response to the filing of the World War II Case,
Congress stated that each injured veteran received approximately $20,000 in
damages for their involuntary labor during the war.120 The mere presence of
the monetary damage award represents access to a quasi-remedy. Thus,
plaintiffs were not totally barred from any remedy at all, and, in a sense, their
customary right was not offended.121 However, the reparation did limit the
type of remedy the plaintiffs could have received in a jury trial.122 The
difference between a full remedy and a limited remedy is subtle indeed. The
effect of the limited remedy exemplifies the alleged conflict between the treaty

117. See discussion supra Part III.A.
118. See PAUST, supra note 15, at 198.
119. See 1 HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW: COLLECTED PAPERS 86-87 (Elihu
Lauterpacht ed., 1970).
120. See infra note 200 and accompanying text.
121. Contra PAUST, supra note 15, at 198.
122. See infra note 200 and accompanying text.
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and customary international law.123 Two examples support the validity of
limiting the remedies of aggrieved parties.
The first example, from a suit similar to the World War II Case, arose out
of atrocities committed by the Nazi Party during World War II.124 Akin to the
limitation of remedies outlined in the Japanese suit, individuals enslaved by the
Nazi Party in the 1940’s were as well limited in their recovery to reparations
only.125 To date, such victims have received equal amounts from a pooling of
over $ 4.3 billion, yet have never survived the scrutiny of the U.S. judicial
system.126 While their pockets are not empty, victims complained that their
true recovery potential had yet to be realized.127 Supported by the argument of
the present subsection of this Note, the limitation on recovery would not have
entirely destroyed the victims right to a remedy.128 Thus, international
customary norms remained intact.129
A second example of a state limiting the recovery of its citizens occurred
in the aforementioned South African decision.130 The South African
government did grant the victims a quasi-remedy by making public apologies
and admissions, even though they were denied access to monetary redress for
the atrocities endured.131 While such a remedy may be inequitable when
viewed in light of the injuries suffered, a remedy was offered. Thus, the right
of an individual to seek a remedy under customary international law was again
likely preserved.132
Even assuming a conflict existed between international customary law,
which arguably grants an automatic right to a remedy for human rights
violations, and the 1951 Treaty of Peace, which wholly denies such a remedy,
it remains unclear whether the norm would trump the treaty as a matter of
international law. Legal scholars differ in their interpretation of the issue.
Particular materials, however, can be turned to for guidance. The legal
document that resolves the dispute is Article 38 of the Statute for the
International Court of Justice.
Expressed in the Statute for the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”),
“[t]he Court, whose function it is to decide in accordance with international

123. See generally PAUST, supra note 15, at 198-210. Paust never implied that a limitation to
a remedy would directly violate international custom. Id.
124. Nazi Era Cases, 129 F. Supp. 2d 370, 380 (D.N.J. 2001).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 381.
127. Id. at 378.
128. See supra notes 102-116 and accompanying text .
129. See supra notes 102-116 and accompanying text.
130. See discussion supra Part III.B.1.
131. See Azanian Peoples Org. v. President of the Rep. of S. Afr., 1996 (4) SALR 637, 638
(CC), available at http://www.legalinfo.co.za/data/CL/1796.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2002).
132. See supra notes 102-116 and accompanying text.
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law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply . . . international
conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly
recognized by the contesting states.”133 While the statute itself was enacted to
assist the ICJ in interpreting which legal principles apply in cases before it, the
provisions could theoretically aid other tribunals (for instance, as persuasive
authority in United States federal and state courts) when ruling on issues of
international law. As Professor Schachter explained, the prevailing sentiment
amongst contemporary legal scholars has been a demand for increased
“positive science of law.”134 Simply, scholars desire a mechanism that makes
international law “realistic and definite,”135 making legal application more
objective. Arguably, Article 38 represents the demystifying mechanism that
could aid a variety of international tribunals in the realm of international legal
interpretation. Thus, because “international conventions” or treaties are cited
first in Article 38, could one reasonably infer that such agreements are
controlling over international custom? Scholars differ slightly in their
opinions.
In terms of articulating a hierarchical strata, Hans Kelsen believed that the
highest rung was occupied by international customary law, rather than
treaties.136 Kelsen argued that treaties were created in the spirit of applicable
general principles contained within customary law.137 In other words, treaty
law possesses the character of international law.138 Similarly, Sir Gerald M.
Fitzmaurice insisted that “treaties are no more a source of law than an ordinary
private law contract,” binding no other parties than those participating in the
agreement itself.139 However, two scholars in particular thought otherwise.
Professor Henkin disagreed in part and believed the “maxim, lex specialis
derogat generali, the specific prevails over the general, was an accepted guide;
it may give priority either to treaty or custom.”140 When assigning authority,
one should first analyze the intent of the contracting nations as either replacing
133. HENKIN ET AL., supra note 65, at 51 (emphasis added).
134. OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 35-36 (1991)
(stating that the “doctrine which became dominant in the nineteenth century and continues to
prevail today lays down veritable conditions for ascertaining and validating legal prescriptions”),
reprinted in HENKIN ET AL., supra note 65, at 52.
135. Id.
136. HANS KELSEN, INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF LEGAL THEORY 108 (Clarendon
Press ed., 1992).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. SIR GERALD M. FITZMAURICE, SOME PROBLEMS REGARDING THE FORMAL SOURCES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 153, 157-58 (Von Asbeck et al. eds., 1958), reprinted in HENKIN ET AL.,
supra note 65, at 95.
140. Id. (second emphasis added) (noting that while “it may be ‘natural’ to apply a treaty . . .
[it] should not be taken to mean that a treaty provision necessarily prevails over a customary
rule”).
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a treaty with customary rule or vice versa. If such intent is ambiguous from
the wording of the agreement, “treaty and custom have equal weight.”141
Richard Baxter, in supporting Henkin, suggested that “[a]s one looks . . . into
the future, it should be quite clear that treaty law will increasingly gain
paramountcy over customary international law [because t]he treaty-making
process is a rational and orderly one, . . . [serving to strengthen custom] and
simplify its application.”142 This view complements Schachter’s view that
international scholars and practitioners yearn for a more scientific or objective
application of the law.143 As observed since the end of World War II, treaties
should ideally be regarded as dynamic creatures that evolve and erode over
time, bowing to the ever-changing tides in the international legal
community.144
Based upon the surrounding circumstances of the 1951 Treaty of Peace, it
would be prudent to assume that the World War II Case court would have
agreed with the assertions of both Lauterpacht and Baxter. As noted, the court
in the World War II Case was searching for a way to support the plain meaning
of the 1951 agreement. Supported by Lauterpaucht’s theories, where a specific
intent or language can be discovered, such an intent or language will be
controlling, even in light of international customary law.145 Indeed, the intent
of the drafters in the 1951 Treaty was to trade litigants’ rights to sue for a more
peaceful and progressive relationship with Japan. Thus, the intent was
identified and was properly viewed as controlling.
As well, the World War II Case comported with the theories of Richard
Baxter.146 Baxter saw the treaty-making process as a rational and orderly one.
The provisions contained within the four corners of the agreement should be
afforded great weight and should be paramount to all other legal precedent.147
Just as Article 38 of the ICJ demanded that treaties be treated as the highest
authority, so did the court in the World War II Case. The non-suit treaty
provision, while in violation of state law, trumped the state law provision, not
only for Constitutional reasons, but also because Article 38 demanded that
treaties be controlling against domestic laws of states. Thus, one could say that
141. HENKIN ET AL., supra note 65, at 95 (explaining that “[i]t is presumed that a treaty is not
terminated or altered by subsequent custom in the absence of evidence that the parties had that
intention”).
142. RICHARD BAXTER, TREATIES AND CUSTOM 101 (1970), reprinted in HENKIN ET AL.,
supra note 65, at 97.
143. HENKIN ET AL., supra note 65, at 52.
144. Id. at 95 (“International agreements . . . have proliferated since the end of World War II.
More than 30,000 treaties have been registered with the United Nations since 1945.”). Virtually
every aspect of social life affecting transnational relations and intercourse is dealt with through
treaties.
145. LAUTERPAUCHT, supra note 119, at 87.
146. HENKIN ET AL., supra note 65, at 97.
147. Id.
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use of international law allowed the court to reach the same conclusion it
reached by using domestic law.
However, even after offering the
aforementioned analysis, it remains unclear if a true answer exists. Illustrating
the second weakness in plaintiffs’ possible argument, it remains unclear
whether customary norms supercede international agreements as a matter of
domestic law.
2.

Critique of Plaintiffs’ Possible Argument: The Domestic Legal
Component

Similar to the lack of clarity evident in deciding whether customary norms
trump treaties as a matter of international law, rectifying the relationship
between the two legal principles on a domestic plane comes with no greater
ease. The confusion as to which rule should control is particularly evident in
the language of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law.148
Specifically, Comment d to Section 115 of the Restatement suggests the
novelty of the inquiry in the U.S. domestic judicial system.149 It states that
“[i]t has also not been authoritatively determined whether a rule of customary
international law that developed after, and is inconsistent with, an earlier
statute or international agreement of the United States should be given effect as
the law of the United States.”150 Thus, after reading the Restatement, one is
left with little guidance.
In an effort to truly resolve the relationship between customary norms and
international agreements on a domestic level, one must turn to the words of
legal scholar, Louis Henkin. According to Henkin, customary international
law is “made” by federal courts as though it were federal law and is binding on
the several states.151 Explaining his theory by way of necessity, Henkin feared
the result that would ensue if all fifty states were left to their own
interpretations of customary international law.152 For purposes of creating a
148. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 115 (1987).
149. Id. at cmt. d.
150. Id.
151. LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 238 (2d ed. 1996).
152. Id. As stated by Henkin:
[B]ut if for the states customary international law had only the status of their common
law, it was presumably subject to modification or repeal by the state legislature. If so, too,
state courts could decide for themselves what international law requires, and issues of
customary international law, unlike questions arising under treaties, would not raise
federal questions and could not be appealed to the Supreme Court for final adjudication.
Fifty states could have fifty different views on some issue of international law and the
federal courts might still have another view. Indeed, not only would the states be free to
disregard the views of the federal courts, but in cases where a federal court is required to
apply the law of the state in which it sits, the court would have to apply the state’s view
on disputed questions of international law . . . .
Id.
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uniform interpretation of international law in general, federal court decisions
based upon prevailing customs were viewed to create federal common law.153
Thus, Henkin presumed that international customary law should be labeled
federal common law.154
Accepting international customary law as the domestic equivalent of
federal common law, one must further venture to find the domestic equivalent
of international agreements. As stated by Henkin, “[i]n the case of treaties, the
Supreme Court has read the Constitution as giving treaties and acts of
Congress equal authority as law.”155 Therefore, the equality of treaties and
statutes in United States domestic law appears to be a firm rule.156 From this
point, a logical leap is merited. While Henkin was very careful not to suppose
that the Framers of the Constitution intended a higher constitutional status for
treaties than for customary law,157 one could conclude this hierarchy to be true
by pitting federal common law (customary law) against a federal statute
(treaties).158 In terms of general constitutional jurisprudence, statutory law will
always trump common law in times of conflict.159 Applying this notion to the
treaty and custom debate, a similar result should occur. This notion alone
would defeat a plaintiff’s argument that suggests, on a domestic level, that a
treaty should be invalid because it conflicts with international customary law.
However, even if such a logical leap is found to be premature by a court, it is
unlikely that such a tribunal would venture to rule in the alternative—that
custom trumps a treaty. As articulated by Henkin, jurists yearn for guidance in
assembling a domestic hierarchy for international legal structures.160 Until
then, confusion will reign supreme.
In sum, to have succeeded in the aforementioned arguments, plaintiffs in
the World War II Case would have had to prove the following: (1) that a true
conflict existed between customary norms and the 1951 Treaty; (2) that the
norm trumped the treaty as a matter of international law; and (3) that the norm
trumped the treaty as a matter of domestic law. Because of the relative

153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 241.
156. HENKIN, supra note 151, at 211.
157. Id. at 237.
158. PATRICK DEVLIN, THE JUDGE 177 (1979) (“Historically, it is made quite differently
from the Continental code. The code precedes judgments; the common law follows them. The
code articulates in chapters, sections and paragraphs the rules in accordance with which
judgments are given.”). From these words, one could infer that because the common law
“follows” the statutes, common law comes into being from a higher source of law which dictates
and controls it. Arguably, courts create and alter common law in the spirit of the foundational
principles found in statutes. Id.
159. Id.
160. HENKIN, supra note 151, at 246.
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uncertainty exhibited by the above-mentioned courts with reference to each of
the issues, it is likely that the plaintiffs would fall short of their goal.
V. POLICY ANALYSIS
The previous section of this Note stated that the World War II Case was
correct in its legal conclusion to uphold the 1951 Treaty non-suit provisions
based upon both international and United States domestic law. Once the legal
analysis is disposed of, it is worthwhile to inquire whether the decision
furthered any policies crucial to the maintenance of U.S. foreign relations. As
suggested in the Introduction, the decision in the World War II Case provided
that sovereign nations should act in a manner that is not selfish and should take
into account the effect of domestic decisions on the entire international
community. Specifically, such a method of action was termed, “looking
outside the box.”161 If the 1951 Treaty non-suit provision was voided by
judicial interpretation, a catastrophic message would have been sent to the
global community. Indeed, international legal skeptics would have had the
fuel necessary to prove that, once again, an international superpower acted in a
manner that grossly ignored international law by disregarding treaty provisions
that are deemed inconvenient to a national interest. Rather, the decision of the
World War II Case court shouted to the world that international law, in the
form of treaties, is binding and should be taken seriously. As a result, the
United States indirectly supported international legal legitimacy and urged
other nations to do the same. In this final section of the Note, an outline will
be offered to show the positive policy effects furthered by the decision in the
case at bar.
A.

1951 Treaty of Peace Abrogated by a Later United States Statute: A Wise
Policy Decision?

When the United States Congress determines that a particular treaty has
been outdated or fails to give effect properly to the ideals it sought to uphold, it
may, under a general consensus, pass a statute that conflicts with the treaty
provisions itself.162 Arguably, the parties to World War II Case suit could
pressure the federal legislature in the future to pass such a statute for purposes
161. See discussion supra Part I.
162. See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 193-94 (1888). In Whitney, the plaintiff sued
to recover amounts paid under protest to the Collector of Customs at New York in satisfaction of
duties assessed upon plaintiff’s shipments of sugar from the Dominican Republic. Plaintiff
alleged that sugar from the Hawaiian Islands was admitted free of duty into the United States, and
claimed that a clause of a treaty between the United States and the Dominican Republic
guaranteed that no higher duty would be assessed upon goods imported into the United States
from the Dominican Republic than was assessed upon goods imported from any other foreign
country. An act of Congress was passed that was found to have superceded the treaty between
the United States and the Dominican Republic because it occurred later in time. Id. at 190-92.
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of receiving justice. In the framework of a civil action, a court could view the
statute and the conflicting treaty provision together and decide if, in fact, the
two cannot co-exist.163 Specifically, when the two relate to the same subject,
courts will always endeavor to construe them so as to give effect to them both,
if that can be done without violating the language of either.164 However, if the
court rules that the two cannot possibly live in harmony with one another, the
document adopted later in time will control the other.165
Thus, because the World War II Case involves a treaty waiver of United
States citizens’ right to sue, it is possible that if convinced, Congress could
enact a code that would conflict with the 1951 Treaty of Peace, granting
veterans a right to sue.166 As a policy issue though, it is unlikely that the
federal government would use its power to controvert the language of the
treaty. As stated by Dulles and scores of politicians involved in the ratification
of the 1951 Treaty of Peace, it proves worthwhile for the provisions of the
treaty to be upheld because the nation has an interest of moving on from its
wartime conflicts with the East.167 The hardships endured by veterans were
not questioned. The government as a whole, however, decided to take action
in concert with the single voice of the nation.168 That single voice of the
Executive demanded that the nation move on as opposed to dwelling on past
atrocities.169 Thus, on a policy level, it seems highly unlikely that a future
statute would be enacted for purposes of abrogating the 1951 Treaty of Peace.
Such action would support the argument of international legal skeptics as
outlined in the next section of the Note. Specifically, skeptics argue that
international law has little effect and is easily discarded by international
superpowers.170

163. Id. at 194.
164. Id.
165. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 115(a)(b) (1999).
An act of Congress supercedes an earlier rule of international law or a provision of an
international agreement as law of the United States if the purpose of the act to supercede
the earlier rule or provision is clear or if the act and the earlier rule or provision cannot be
fairly reconciled. That a rule of international law or a provision of an international
agreement is superceded as domestic law does not relieve the United States of its
international obligation or of the consequences of a violation of that obligation . . . .
Id.
166. Id.
167. World War II Case, 114 F. Supp. 2d 939, 946 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
168. Id. at 948.
169. Id.
170. See discussion infra Part V.B.
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Proving International Legal Skeptics Wrong: Optimist Views Should be
Supported in Furtherance of Public Policy

“Skeptical” legal philosophers have long felt that both international law
and the principles it seeks to uphold prove rather ineffective because, at face
value, the international legal system lacks traditional enforcement tools.171
Conversely, the World War II Case illustrated the effectiveness of an
international instrument, namely, treaties. There, treaty signatories adhered to
the verbiage of the instrument and enforced its provisions without any pressure
from other members of the international community. However, when so
frequently nations disregard treaties or general custom, as established by
international practice, onlookers are quick to conclude that the system itself is
flawed and that individual nation states are free to act as they choose.172
International legal skeptics fail to recognize that the absence of a legislative
body is not at all fatal to the legitimacy of the international schematic.173
Treaties represent such a non-legislative legal entity, which have proven
rather effective on a consistent basis.174 Yet, contemporary scholars who
subscribe to the skeptic’s school of thought have recently questioned even the
effectiveness of treaties and other enforcement mechanisms in the realm of
international human rights.175 Specifically, where treaties seek to deny human
rights victims of their day in court, academics have claimed that such
restrictive bi-lateral agreements do more harm than good.176 If able to jump
through the varying procedural hoops at the domestic court level, some
scholars argue that human rights victims should be afforded a right to name
their oppressors in the framework of a domestic civil action.177 Otherwise,
they argue, the interests of the negotiating parties, namely, those politicians
with party agendas, will prevail in spite of the private interests of citizens.178
171. Richard A. Falk, The Adequacy of Contemporary Theories of International Law: Gaps in
Legal Thinking, 50 VA. L. REV. 231, 249 (1964) (“The status of controverted behavior as legal or
illegal is quite problematical . . . because no central institutions exist to make judgments that will
be treated as authoritative by states.”).
172. Id. (explaining that when such violations of international law are committed by a leading
world super-power, it seems easy for them to disregard the offense and escape sanctions).
173. LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE 26 (2d ed. 1979).
174. See HENKIN ET AL., supra note 65, at 95; see also supra note 144 and accompanying
text. By definition, treaties are formed by the executive as opposed to the legislative bodies of
governments. Id.
175. See Developments in the Law—Corporate Liability for Violations of International
Human Rights Law, supra note 11, at 2026.
176. Boyd, supra note 11, at 283-84.
177. Id. at 322 (stating that “the ‘single voice’ perception can be misleading . . . [and] would
commit the identification of customary human rights norms to the political branches and would
ignore the clearly established role of courts in clarifying murky areas of law”).
178. Id. (arguing that “the notion of fundamental human rights embodies an understanding
that individual interests prevail over state prerogatives”).
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However, if such individual interests prevailed, much harm would come upon
the international system.
Viewing the international legal structure in a completely different light,
legal “optimists” posit that the struggle for legitimacy in international law is a
false inquiry. On a metaphysical level, man is bound by international law
simply because he desires order in his existence.179 Similarly, states are bound
by the rules of the international realm because they themselves are founded on
the binding nature of law, creating a stable and relatively predictable society.180
Furthering the theories of the optimist faction of international legal scholars,
Professor Akehurst qualified the often-challenged philosophy of his colleagues
with a paradox. Relying on a premise touted by the skeptic regime, Akehurst
admitted that often powerful nation states take advantage of their international
stature and support laws that inherently further their own interests.181 While
such a system may be anti-democratic, “it is unlikely that [such states] will
create laws that . . . they will be tempted to break.”182 Thus, such laws will be
followed not because of the presence of an international police system, but
because nations choose to do so voluntarily.183 In a sense, the end justifies the
means.
Following the aforementioned analysis, one could say that the World War
II Case furthered the cause of international legal optimists—simply, that
international law has “teeth” and should be followed in furtherance of its
existence and effectiveness.184 Countering the view of skeptics, the court
furthered a notion that, in practice, nations actually feel obligated to adhere to
international law; no choice is available.185 Furthermore, to preserve the
effectiveness of treaty law, an established form of international law, nations
must adhere to its provisions.186 By deciding in favor of the non-suit provision
in the 1951 Treaty, the World War II Case fueled the fire of the optimist
faction. Essentially speaking for the United States as a whole, the court
affirmed the principle that states are bound by the rules of the international
realm because they themselves are founded on the binding nature of law,
creating a stable and relatively predictable society.187 Without honoring such
international legal provisions, the United States would be snubbing the reason
for its own existence since arguably, nations receive their legitimacy from the

179.
180.
181.
1987).
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

J. L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 56 (6th ed. 1963).
Id.
MICHAEL AKEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 8 (6th ed.
Id.
Id.
Falk, supra note 171, at 249.
BRIERLY, supra note 179, at 56.
Id.
Id.
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mere presence of international law. Members of states pay homage to the
international legal system by honoring the laws it imposes upon them.188
Therefore, in honoring the 1951 Treaty in its entirety, the World War II Case
court furthered the policy of the necessity to follow stated international
principles.189
C. In re World War II Case Upholds Similar Policies Stressed in South
Africa
At the close of World War II, while negotiating the particulars of the 1951
Treaty of Peace, John Foster Dulles stated, “Leaving open the possibility of
future [war reparation] claims would be an unacceptable impediment to a
lasting peace [between the United States and Japan].”190 Almost fifty years
later, in a land left scarred by decades of Apartheid oppression, Justice
Mahomed of the Constitutional Court for South Africa uttered, “those who
negotiated the Constitution [of South Africa] made a deliberate choice,
preferring understanding over vengeance, reparation over retaliation, ubuntu
over victimization.”191 While thousands of miles and decades of time
separated the two aforementioned declarants, it is possible that their argument
for policy was the same.
In an effort to rebuild both the government and hearts of its citizens, the
newly instated South African government declared in the 1990’s that it would
allow those who committed atrocities against its citizens during Apartheid to
confess their deeds before the public in exchange for their amnesty and
exemption from private causes of action.192 As expected, numerous members
of the public demanded justice and found no comfort in allowing their
oppressors to be set free.193 The foresight of various South African leaders,
namely Nelson Mandela, allowed the shattered nation to again rebuild and
become an international economic contender.194 A non-suit provision in the
South African Constitution theoretically violated a citizen’s right to confront
his oppressor. Government officials, however, urged angered individuals to
look forward for the betterment of the nation as a whole.195 Indeed, South
Africa was not claiming that citizens should forget the recent past. Rather, it
desired to heal the inner wounds of the soul by recognizing that the future of
the nation was bright, transforming grief and anger into a mature
188. HENKIN, supra note 173, at 25.
189. Id. at 26.
190. World War II Case, 114 F. Supp. 2d 939, 946 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
191. See Azanian Peoples Org. v. President of the Rep. of S. Afr., 1996 (4) SALR 637, 648
(CC), available at http://www.legalinfo.co.za/data/CL/1796.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2002).
192. Id. at 640.
193. Id. at 644.
194. Id. at 648.
195. Id.
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understanding that progressed national reconstruction.196 Without some
sacrifice of personal claims, the future of the nation would have been halted
due to scores of lengthy litigation.197
Similarly, the words of Dulles came at a time of national healing during
the post-World War II Era. For the American nation to rebuild and allow its
one-time enemies to gain strength for purposes of one day becoming economic
allies, personal interests of aggrieved citizens needed to be seen as secondary
to national interests.198 Like their African counterpart, the United States
desired to further a philosophy of understanding over vengeance to meet the
future without hatred.199 The World War II Case decision affirmed the notion
that American veterans should, like oppressed South African citizens, turn the
other cheek in an effort to progress the stability of international relations. In
short, the greater good should prevail.
D. The Cost to International Legitimacy Far Outweighs the Benefit of Suit
Before speculating about the amounts recoverable under a victim’s private
cause of action, it is necessary to view what they have received under the
provisions of The 1951 Treaty of Peace. Contained within the Statement of
Interest of the United States of America, the governmental response to the
World War II Case, the following figures prove most thought provoking:
Consistent with its congressional mandate, the War Claims Commission paid
claimants who were prisoners of war in the hands of the Japanese a specific
amount for each day of captivity of the war. Specifically, prisoners of war
were paid $1 per day for each day the government by which they were held
violated its obligation to furnish them the quantity of food for which they were
entitled as prisoners under the Geneva Convention related to prisoners of war.
Individuals were also paid $1.50 per day for each day they were used as forced
labor or otherwise mistreated in violation of the Geneva Convention. A person
who was captured at Bataan and remained a prisoner of war for the duration of
the war would have been compensated approximately $3,103.50. Adjusted for
inflation using the published Consumer Price Indexes for June 1951 (25.9%)
and June 2000 (172.3%), the present day value of that amount is approximately
$20,646.200

Arguably, the award described above is nominal considering the emotional
and physical turmoil experienced by the individual plaintiffs. Yet, when court
costs, attorney’s fees, and emotional hardship incurred by the mere filing of the
196. Azanian Peoples Org., 1996 (4) SALR at 648.
197. Id.
198. World War II Case, 114 F. Supp. 2d 939, 946 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
199. Id.
200. Statement of Interest of the United States of America, In re World War II Case Era
Japanese Forced Labor Litigation, 114 F. Supp. 2d 939 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (filed Aug. 9, 2000),
quoted in Murphy, supra note 7, at 142 n. 11.
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action, are figured into the damage equation, the gain appears significant.
Furthermore, as described in Burger-Fischer, Iwanowa, Azanian Peoples
Organization and In re Nazi Era, the mere fact that the transgressions occurred
so long ago works against a party asserting a private claim.201 Another
principle absent in any of the previously cited case law is the theory that
damage awards theoretically shrink in class action suits. As the award is
spread around, the shares distributed decrease in value. When coupled with the
numerous procedural and jurisdictional hurdles involved in such a case, the
nominal reparation amount seems fair on its face.
Keeping in mind the possible gain to reap from a suit of this nature, one
must seriously consider the subsequent harm on international relations. Even
though Japan has more than recovered economically since the conclusion of
the Second World War, a further financial demand will no doubt frustrate the
trust established between the United States and its East Asian counterpart.202
War is a time when the ugliest faces of humankind reveal themselves. To
reopen old wounds would compromise the sense of closure already achieved
by so many war veterans who would just as soon move on. Analogous in part
to the desire of the South African government to seek a more peaceful and
productive future, the United States utilized the 1951 Treaty as its own truth
commission, yearning for understanding and reparation as opposed to
vengeance and retaliation.203 The policy of forward thinking no doubt
prevailed, supporting the maintenance of pre-existing international
relationships.
E.

Japan Smells a Rat: That Rat is an Attorney

In response to the suits filed against various Japanese corporations in 1999,
certain Japanese politicians raised suspicions as to the reasoning for the timing
of the suits. The World War II Case was filed in Los Angeles on December 7,
1999, at exactly 10:55 a.m., the precise moment in Los Angeles of the 1941
Pearl Harbor attack.204 Undoubtedly, when such news reached the East,
certain members of the Japanese population were enraged over the public
statement being made by American citizens. That was the intent of Edward D.
Fagan, attorney for the plaintiffs in the World War II Case.205
Arguably, Japanese politicians were drawing conclusions that should have
alarmed American citizens. The suit was originally filed by lawyers who had

201. See Burger-Fischer, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 285; Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 450; Azanian
Peoples Org., 1996 (4) SALR at 648; Nazi Era Cases, 129 F. Supp. 2d 370 (D.N.J. 2001).
202. World War II Case, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 947.
203. Azanian Peoples Org., 1996 (4) SALR at 661.
204. Teresa Watanabe, California and the West: Japanese Firms Sued Over WWII, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 8, 1999, at A3.
205. Id.
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just come off a victory lap from their recent triumph in Europe with regard to
Holocaust-Era claims against German corporations.206 A one billion dollar
damage settlement was recovered for the various Holocaust survivors who had
made the lucky list under the class action suit.207 While not directly stated, it
could be inferred, as the Japanese did, that the World War II Case was the
result of a money hungry attorney who wanted to utilize arguments from the
European suit to recover substantial funds from the Japanese.208 It was easy
money. The observation follows with the assumption that perhaps the
attorneys in question did not have justice in mind, but rather their children’s
college funds. In the following passage, attorney Edward Fagan illustrated his
rationale behind the filing of the suit:
A goal of the suits is to bring so much public pressure on the Japanese that
they will opt for a political settlement similar to the one being brokered among
European firms, the U.S. and the German government . . . targeting Japanese
banks would open the issue to scrutiny from such regulators as state
controllers, banking committee members, and other entities susceptible to
public pressure . . .209

When one views this statement of lawyer strategy together with the intent
of the members of the class action suit in the World War II Case, it is apparent
that the two conflict. Throughout the suit, many plaintiffs went on record as
saying that they desired to have their day in court for purposes of revealing the
details of wartime offenses committed against American soldiers in the
Pacific.210 While damages were important to them, their primary concern was
to educate the public.211 Thus, the settlement strategy of the lead attorney
arguably controverted the needs and wants of his clients. Indeed, something
was awry.212
The Japanese responded to these observations by exclaiming that these
claims were a “form of extortion” and that if the United States desired to do so,
the gloves essentially would come off.213 In an effort to combat the claims and
show that America was not without guilt in the Second World War, Japanese
officials voiced a desire to surface the questionable usage of atomic warfare in

206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Watanabe, supra note 204, at A3.
210. Bob Pool, A Culver City Couple Were Among the American Civilians Held Prisoner in
Barbaric Conditions in the Philippines During World War II Case: Now They Tell Japan It’s
Time to Pay Up, L.A. TIMES, May 14, 2000, at B1.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Efron, supra note 2, at A1.
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both Hiroshima and Nagasaki.214 Arguably, tensions would have soared had
the World War II Case gone before a jury.
Dulles feared that allowing such suits to prevail would hinder progressive
international relations with Japan.215 These quotes made by Japanese officials
demonstrate that the fears of Dulles came close to being true. For purposes of
supporting the aforementioned policy arguments throughout this section of the
piece, it seemed crucial that Justice Walker thwart the efforts of attorneys like
Edward Fagan in an effort to preserve pre-existing international relationships
and global stability. Otherwise, the efforts and intentions of treaty negotiators
like John Foster Dulles would be undermined.
VI. CONCLUSION
As a result of the prior analysis one can begin to view the tantamount
importance of preserving international rules of law. Derogating from such
established rules of law would prove catastrophic in that each nation would be
free to act on its will alone. While the World War II Case represented a reaffirmation of established treaty law, the subject matter of its decision is
contested even today. Recently, Anthony D’Amato, a professor of law at
Northwestern University, filed an action in federal court on behalf of more
than 400,000 American citizens who were killed or injured during World War
II. They seek over one trillion dollars in reparations. It is likely that they will
meet the same preclusion and jurisdictional obstacles described in this Note. It
is almost certain that they will fail. Otherwise, a windfall of suits will plague
the judicial system for years to come. Indeed, to protect the purpose and
policy prudently set forth in post-war treaties, veterans must now, more than
ever, “take one for the team.”
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